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Abstract—What are the key-features that enable an informa-
tion diffusion model to explain the inherent dynamic, and often
competitive, nature of real-world propagation phenomena? In
this paper we aim to answer this question by proposing a novel
class of diffusion models, inspired by the classic Linear Threshold
model, and built around the following aspects: trust/distrust in
the user relationships, which is leveraged to model different
effects of social influence on the decisions taken by an individual;
changes in adopting one or alternative information items; hesita-
tion towards adopting an information item over time; latency in
the propagation; time horizon for the unfolding of the diffusion
process; and multiple cascades of information that might occur
competitively. To the best of our knowledge, the above aspects
have never been unified into the same LT-based diffusion model.
We also define different strategies for the selection of the initial
influencers to simulate non-competitive and competitive diffusion
scenarios, particularly related to the problem of limitation of
misinformation spread. Results on publicly available networks
have shown the meaningfulness and uniqueness of our models.
Index Terms—information diffusion, influence propagation,
trust/distrust relationships, limitation of misinformation spread
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early applications in viral marketing, the develop-
ment of information diffusion models and their embedding in
optimization methods has provided effective support to address
a variety of influence propagation problems. However, one crit-
icism that arises from existing diffusion models is the concern
as to whether, and to what extent, they are adequate to explain
the actual complexity of influence propagation phenomena that
occur in the modern society of information. The acquisition
and share of true or reliable information has often to cope with
unlimited misinformation spots over the Web, e.g., fake news
[12] mostly associated with consequences on the real life of
individuals. A few studies on the spreading of fake news and
hoaxes (e.g., [20]) have found that the difficulty for users of
checking the reliability or trustworthiness of the web source
generating and/or sharing the information item, can increase
the likelihood of people to be deceived. Within this view, one
side effect is the tendency of users to access information from
like-minded sources and remain within information bubbles.
In general, in the attempt of debunking misinformation,
one might intuitively recognize two main strategies: real-time
detection and correction, or delayed correction [11]. In both
cases, the response time plays a crucial role into the limitation
of misinformation diffusion, since users tend to reinforce their
own belief — a cognitive phenomenon known as confirmation
bias. It may also happen that such corrections do not yield the
expected outcome, or they may even produce “backfire” results
driving people’s attention to the fake news.
In this scenario, it appears that one recipe to deal with the
interleaving of information and dis/misinformation should be
to educate people to be mindful of the informative source.
Unfortunately, it is often difficult to understand where an
information item originated from. Therefore, it turns out to
be essential to capture the effects that different types of social
ties, particularly trust/distrust relationships, can have on both
the user behavior and propagation dynamics. Two related
questions hence arise: Q1 – What are the key-features that
make a diffusion model able to explain the inherent dynamic,
and often competitive, nature of real-world propagation phe-
nomena? Q2 – Do the currently used models of diffusion
already incorporate such features?
To address question Q1, we recognize a number of aspects
as essential constituents of a “realistic” information diffusion
model, namely: (1) leveraging trust/distrust information in the
user relationships to capture different effects of influence on
decisions taken by a user; (2) accounting for a user’s change in
adopting one or alternative information items (i.e., relaxation
of the diffusion progressivity assumption); (3) accounting for
a user’s hesitation or inclination towards the adoption of an
information over time; (4) accounting for time-dependent vari-
ables, such as latency, to explain the propagation dynamics;
(5) dealing with multiple cascades of information that might
occur competitively.
Motivating example. To support our above hypothesis with
an example, consider a typical scenario occurring in a political
campaign, where two candidates want to target the audience
of potential electors. Assume that every elector is initially
unbiased toward one of the two candidates. The decision about
which candidate to vote it will likely be the result of exogenous
and endogenous influencing factors, i.e., one may be genuinely
influenced by decisions taken by her/his social contacts —
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Table I: Summary of related work based on optimization prob-
lem, basic diffusion model (DM), competitive diffusion (C),
non-progressivity (NP), time-aware activation (TA), delayed
propagation (DP), trust/distrust relations (TD).
Ref. Problem DM C NP TA DP TD
[3] rumor blocking IC X
[22] rumor blocking IC X
[9] rumor blocking LT X
[7] rumor blocking distrib. X
[5] positive influ. max. IC X
[17] active time max. IC X
[8] PTS min. LT X
[4] positive influ. max. Voter X X
[21] positive influ. max. LT X X
[23] positive influ. max. LT X X
[16] time-constrain. influ. max. IC X
[6] time-constrain. influ. max. IC X
[19] positive influ. max. IC X X X X
[15] rumor blocking LT X X X
[18] positive influ. max. IC X
impact of homophily factors — but s/he may also have
formed her/his own opinion outside the network of friends.
However, an individual’s decision can also be influenced by
the behavior of neighboring foes. As a consequence of such
negative influence received by foes, one may become more
hesitant in taking a decision, which would be reflected by a
quiescence status of the elector before being fully engaged
in the promotion of the chosen candidate. Moreover, once an
elector becomes active in favor of a particular candidate, it will
be more difficult to change her/his mind over time, therefore a
time-aware notion of activation threshold is needed to model
the effects due to the confirmation bias. Finally, all decisions
must be taken before the time limit (i.e., the election day) that
constrains the political campaign period.
Concerning question Q2, a relatively large corpus of re-
search studies has been developed in the last few years in
the attempt of explaining realistic propagation phenomena,
building upon classic information diffusion models, such as
Independent Cascade (IC) and Linear Threshold (LT) [10].
Table I provides a schematic overview of models that incor-
porate one or more of the aspects mentioned before about Q1;
it is worth noting that no existing work unifies all of the above
aspects into the same (LT-based) diffusion model.
Contributions. In this paper, we propose a novel class of
diffusion models, named Friend-Foe Dynamic Linear Thresh-
old Models (F 2DLT ), which are based on the classic LT
model and are designed to deal with non-competitive as well
as competitive time-varying propagation scenarios. In our
proposed models, the information diffusion graph is defined on
top of a trust network, so that the strength of trust and distrust
relationships is encoded into the influence probabilities. The
behavior of a user in response to influencing actions is
modeled with a time-varying activation function, depending
on both the inherent activation-threshold of the user and
her/his tendency of keeping or leaving the campaign-specific
activation state over time. We also introduce a quiescence
function to model the latency or delay that the influence
of foes may determine in the participation of a user in the
information propagation. For competitive scenarios, we define
a semi-progressive model, which assumes that a user, once
activated, is only allowed to switch to a different campaign,
and a non-progressive model, which instead requires a user to
have always the support of her/his in-neighbors to keep the
activation state with a certain campaign.
Another contribution of this work is the definition of four
seed selection strategies, which mimic different, realistic sce-
narios of influence propagation. These strategies are central to
our methodology of propagation simulation, since the devel-
opment of optimization methods under our diffusion models is
beyond the goals of this work. Notably, in competitive scenar-
ios, we have focused on combinations of campaign strategies
that might be reasonably considered for a misinformation
spread limitation problem. Experimental evaluation conducted
on four real-world networks has provided interesting findings
on the meaningfulness and uniqueness of our proposed models.
II. FRIEND-FOE DYNAMIC LINEAR THRESHOLD MODELS
Here we describe our proposed F 2DLT models: the Non-
Competitive F 2DLT (nC-F 2DLT ), the Semi-Progressive
F 2DLT (spC-F 2DLT ), and the Non-Progressive F 2DLT
(npC-F 2DLT ). We first provide an overview of the frame-
work based on F 2DLT . Next, we introduce key features
common to all models, then we elaborate on each of them.
A. Overview
Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual architecture of a frame-
work based on our proposed models. Given a population of
OSN users, the framework requires three main inputs: (i) a
trust network, which is inferred from the social network of
those users to model their trust/distrust relationships; (ii) user
behavioral characteristics that are intrinsic to each user (i.e.,
exogenous to an information diffusion scenario) and oriented
to express two aspects: activation-threshold, i.e., the effort
needed to activate a user through cumulative influence from
her/his neighbors, and quiescence, i.e., the user’s hesitation in
being actively committed with the propagation process; and,
(iii) one or multiple competing campaigns, i.e., information
cascades generated from the agent(s) having viral marketing
purposes. Moreover, the information diffusion process has a
time horizon, and its temporal unfolding is reflected in the
evolution of the information diffusion graph: this also depends
on the dynamics of the users’ behaviors in response to the
influence chains started by the campaign(s), which admit that
users may switch from the adoption of a campaign’s item
to that of another one. Putting it all together, our F 2DLT
based framework embeds all previously discussed aspects that
are required to explain complex propagation phenomena, i.e.,
competitive diffusion, non-progressivity, time-aware activa-
tion, delayed propagation, and trust/distrust relations.
B. Basic definitions
We are given a trust network represented by a directed graph
G = 〈V,E,w〉, with set of nodes V , set of edges E, and
weighting function w : E 7→ [−1, 1] such that, for every
edge (u, v) ∈ E, wuv := w(u, v) expresses how much v
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Figure 1: Illustration of the information diffusion framework
based on our proposed F 2DLT .
trusts its in-neighbor u. Positive, resp. negative, value of wuv
corresponds to a trust, resp. distrust, relation.
For every v ∈ V , we denote with N in+ (v) and N in− (v)
the set of neighbors trusted by v (i.e., friends of v) and
the set of neighbors distrusted by v (i.e., foes of v), re-
spectively. Moreover, it holds that
∑
u∈Nin+ (v) wuv ≤ 1 and∑
u∈Nin− (v) |wuv| ≤ 1.
Let G = G(g, q, T ) = 〈V,E,w, g, q, T 〉 be a directed
weighted graph representing the LT-based information diffu-
sion graph associated with trust network G, where T denotes
a time interval for the diffusion process, g and q denote
time-dependent activation-threshold and quiescence functions.
These are introduced in G to model the aspects of time-
aware activation and delayed propagation, respectively. We
use symbol St to denote the set of active nodes at time t, and
symbol S˜t to denote the set of active nodes for which, at t, the
quiescence time is not expired yet, i.e., the quiescent nodes.
Activation-threshold function: According to the LT
model, every node v ∈ V is associated with an exogenous
activation-threshold, θv ∈ (0, 1], which corresponds to the a-
priori effort needed in terms of cumulative influence to activate
the node. We enhance this concept by defining an activation-
threshold function, g : V, T 7→ R+, such that for v ∈ V, t ∈ T :
g(v, t) = θv + ϑ(θv, t),
i.e., the activation of v at time t depends both on the user’s
pre-assigned threshold, θv , and on a time-evolving activation
term, ϑ(·, ·), which models the dynamic response of a user
towards the activation attempt exerted by her/his neighbors.
To specify ϑ(·, ·), we might devise at least two main
scenarios for g(·, ·): (i) non-decreasing monotone, and (ii) non-
monotone function, for any v ∈ V . In the first scenario, g(·, ·)
would model the tendency of a user to consolidate her/his
belief, according to the confirmation-bias principle [1]. By
contrast, the second scenario would be useful to capture a
user’s behavior to revise her/his uncertainty to activate over
time, thus becoming more or less inclined to change her/his
opinion on an information item. In this work, we focus on
the confirmation bias principle, thus choosing the following
form for the activation-threshold function, by which the value
increases by increasing the time a node keeps staying in the
same active state:
g(v, t) = θv + ϑ(θv, t) = θv + δ ×min
{
1− θv
δ
, t− tlastv
}
(1)
where tlastv denotes the last (i.e., most recent) time v was
activated and δ ≥ 01 represents the increment in the value of
g(v, t) for consecutive time-steps. Thus, the longer a node has
kept its active state for the same information cascade (cam-
paign), the higher its activation value, and as a consequence,
it will be harder to make the node change its state, or even
no more possible (i.e., g(v, t) saturates to 1, as the difference
(t− tlastv ) exceeds (1− θv)/δ).
Quiescence function: Each node in G is also associated
with a quiescence value, which quantifies the latency in prop-
agation through that node. We define a quiescence function,
q : V, T 7→ T , non-decreasing and monotone, such that for
every v ∈ V, t ∈ T , with v activated at time t:
q(v, t) = τv + ψ(N
in
− (v), t),
where τv ∈ T represents an exogenous term modeling the
user’s hesitation in being fully committed with the propaga-
tion process, and ψ(N in− (v), t) provides an additional delay
proportional to the amount of v’s neighbors that are distrusted
and active, by the time the activation attempt is performed by
the v’s trusted neighbors:
q(v, t) = τv + ψ(N
in
− (v), t) = τv + exp
(
λ×
∑
u∈St−1
|w−(u, v)|
)
(2)
where λ ≥ 0 is a coefficient modeling the average user
sensitivity in the perceived negative influence. Intuitively, this
coefficient would weight more the negative influence as the
diffusing informative item is more “worth of suspicion”.
Rationale for activation and propagation: Our choice
of using, on the one hand, friends for the activation of a user,
and on the other hand, foes to impact on delayed propagation,
represents a key distinction from related work [15], [21], [23].
In our setting, we tend to reject as true in general, the principle
“I agree with my friends’ idea and disagree with my foes’
idea”, which is also close to the adage “the enemy of my
enemy is my friend”. Rather, we believe that any user might
be provided with a self-determination capability. Therefore, in
our models, the trusted connections and distrusted connections
play different roles: only friends can exert a degree of influ-
ence, whereas foes can only contribute to increase the user’s
hesitation to commit with the propagation process.
C. Non-Competitive Model
We introduce the first of the three proposed models, which
refers to a single-item propagation scenario. Figure 2 shows
the life-cycle of a node in the diffusion graph under this model.
1We assume the second additive term in Eq. (1) is zero if δ = 0.
inactivestart quiescent contagious
activation
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Figure 2: Life-cycle of a node in the nC-F 2DLT model.
Definition 1. Non-Competitive Friend-Foe Dynamic Linear
Threshold Model (nC-F 2DLT ). Let G = 〈V,E,w, g, q, T 〉
be the diffusion graph of Non-Competitive Friend-Foe Dy-
namic Linear Threshold Model (nC-F 2DLT ). The diffusion
process under the nC-F 2DLT model unfolds in discrete time
steps. At time t = 0, an initial set of nodes S0 is activated. At
time t ≥ 1, the following rule applies: for any inactive node
v ∈ V \ (St−1 ∪ S˜t−1), if
∑
u∈Nin+ (v)∩St−1 wuv ≥ g(v, t),
then v will be added to the set of quiescent nodes S˜t, with
quiescence time equal to t∗ = q(v, t). Once the quiescence
time is expired, v will be removed from S˜t and added to the set
of active nodes St∗ . The process continues until T is expired
or no more activation attempts can be performed.
D. Competitive Models
Here we introduce the two competitive F 2DLT models.
Let us first provide our motivation for developing two different
competitive models: through the following example, we illus-
trate a particular situation that may occur when dealing with
two campaigns competitively propagating through a network.
Please note that, throughout the rest of this paper, we will
consider only two competing campaigns for the sake of sim-
plicity; nevertheless, our proposed models are generalizable
to more than two competing campaigns.
Example 1. Figure 3 shows an example activation sequence
in a competitive scenario between two information cascades,
distinguished by colors red and green. At time t = 0, nodes u
and z are green-active, and their joint influence causes green-
activation of node v as well (since 0.3 + 0.5 ≥ 0.6). At time
t = 1, as fully influenced by node x, node z has switched its
activation in favor of the red campaign. After this switch, at
time t = 2, it happens that v’s activation status is no more
consistent with the (joint or individual) influenced exerted by
u and z. In particular, two mutually exclusive events might
in principle happen at t = 2: either v is deactivated or v
maintains its green-activation state. 
The uncertainty situation depicted in the above example
prompted us to the definition of two models, namely semi-
progressive and non-progressive F 2DLT : the former cor-
responds to the case of v keeping its current (i.e., green)
activation state, whereas the latter corresponds to v returning
to the inactive state. Clearly, the two models’ semantics are
different from each other: the semi-progressive model assumes
that a user, once activated, cannot step aside, unlike the non-
progressive one, which instead requires a user to have always
the support of her/his in-neighbors to keep activation.
Given two information cascades, or campaigns C ′, C ′′, for
every time step t ∈ T we will use symbols S′t and S′′t to
u z
xv
0.3 0.5
1
t = 0
θv = 0.6
u z
xv
0.3 0.5
1
θv = 0.6
t = 1
u z
xv
0.3 0.5
1
t = 2
Keep green-active or deactivate?
θv = 0.6
Figure 3: Uncertainty in a two-campaign activation sequence.
denote the sets of active nodes, such that that S′t ∩ S′′t = ∅,
and analogously symbols S˜′t and S˜′′t as the sets of quiescent
nodes, for C ′ and C ′′, respectively. Also, St = S′t ∪ S′′t and
S˜t = S˜′t ∪ S˜′′t.
It should also be noted that, while sharing the time interval
(T ) of diffusion, C ′ and C ′′ are not constrained to start at
the same time t0. Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity, we
hereinafter assume that t0 = t′0 = t
′′
0 (with t0 ∈ T ), unless
otherwise specified (cf. Sect. IV).
Definition 2. Semi-Progressive Competitive Friend-Foe Dy-
namic Linear Threshold Model (spC-F 2DLT ). Let G =
〈V,E,w, g, q, T 〉 be the diffusion graph of Semi-Progressive
Competitive Friend-Foe Dynamic Linear Threshold Model
(spC-F 2DLT ), and C ′, C ′′ be two campaigns on G. The
diffusion process under the spC-F 2DLT model unfolds in
discrete time steps. At time t = 0, two initial sets of nodes, S′0
and S′′0 , are activated for each campaign. At every time step
t ≥ 1, the following rules apply:
R1. For any inactive node v ∈ V \ (St−1 ∪ S˜t−1),
if
∑
Nin+ (v)∩S′t−1 wuv ≥ g(v, t), then v will be added to S˜′t;
analogous rule holds for C ′′.
R2. Given a node active for C ′′, v ∈ S′′t−1, if∑
Nin+ (v)∩S′t−1 wuv ≥ g(v, t) and
∑
Nin+ (v)∩S′t−1 wuv >∑
Nin+ (v)∩S′′t−1 wuv , then v will be removed from S
′′
t and added
to S′t; analogous rule holds for any node active for the first
campaign.
R3. Every active node for which none of the above
conditions is matched will keep its current state.
R4. When a node v is activated for the first time, it will
stay in S˜′t or S˜′′t until the quiescence time is expired.
R5. For every node that can be simultaneously activated
by both campaigns, a tie-breaking rule will apply, in order
to decide which campaign actually determines the node’s
activation.
As shown in Fig. 4, once a node becomes active, it cannot
turn back to the inactive state, but it can only change the acti-
vation campaign. Moreover, switch transitions occur instantly.
Definition 3. Non-Progressive Competitive Friend-Foe Dy-
namic Linear Threshold Model (npC-F 2DLT ). Let G =
〈V,E,w, g, q, T 〉 be the diffusion graph of Non-Progressive
Competitive Friend-Foe Dynamic Linear Threshold Model
(npC-F 2DLT ), and C ′, C ′′ be two campaigns on G. The dif-
fusion process in npC-F 2DLT evolves according to the same
rules as in spC-F 2DLT plus the following rule concerning
the deactivation process of an active node:
inactive quiescent contagious
C′′
C′
switch
Figure 4: Life-cycle of a node in competitive models. Dashed
lines are valid for npC-F 2DLT only.
R6. For any active node v at time t − 1, if∑
Nin+ (v)∩S′t−1 wuv < θv and
∑
Nin+ (v)∩S′′t−1 wuv < θv , then v
will turn back to the inactive state at time t.
It should be noted that a node’s deactivation rule depends on
θv only (rather than on the whole function g(v, t)); otherwise,
every node activated at a given time could deactivate itself in
the next time step, due to the increase in its activation thresh-
old. In Fig. 4, note that, unlike in spC-F 2DLT , transitions to
inactive state are allowed.
III. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
Data: We used four real-world, publicly available networks,
namely: Epinions [14], Slashdot [14], Wiki-Conflict [2], and
Wiki-Vote [13]. The first two are “who-trust-whom” networks,
Wiki-Conflict refers to Wikipedia users involved in an “edit-
war” (i.e., edges represent either positive or negative conflicts
in editing a wikipage), and Wiki-Vote models relations be-
tween Wikipedia users that voted for/against each other in
admin elections. Table II summarizes main characteristics of
the networks. Note that to favor meaningful competition of
campaigns based on selected pairs of strategies, we limited the
diffusion context to the largest strongly connected component
in each evaluation network, except for Wiki-Conflict.
All networks are originally directed and signed; in addition,
the two Wikipedia-based networks also have timestamped
edges. In order to derive the weighted graphs of influence
probabilities, we defined the following method: for every
(u, v) ∈ E, the edge weight wuv was sampled from a binomial
distribution B(|N in+ (v)|, p) if u ∈ N in+ (v) (i.e., v trusts u),
otherwise wuv ∼ −B(|N in− (v)|, p), where the probability of
success p is equal to the fraction of trust edges in the network.
We performed 1, 000 samplings of edge weights, for each
of the four networks. Therefore, all presented results will
correspond to averages of 1, 000 simulation runs.
Seed selection strategies: We defined four seed selection
strategies, each of which mimics a different, realistic scenario
of influence propagation.
Exogenous and malicious sources of information: This
method, hereinafter referred to as M-Sources, aims at simulat-
ing the presence of multiple sources of malicious information
within the network. Here, an exogenous source is meant as a
node without incoming links, e.g., a user that is just interested
in spreading her/his opinion: such a node is also regarded as
Table II: Summary of evaluation network data.
Epinions Slashdot Wiki-Conflict Wiki-Vote
#nodes 131 828 77 350 116 836 7 118
#edges 841 372 516 575 2 027 871 103 675
% distrusted/negative-edges 14.7% 23.3% 61.9% 21.6%
avg. degree 6.38 6.67 17.36 6.68
diameter 14 11 10 7
clust. coeff. 0.093 0.026 0.015 0.128
strong LCC #nodes 36 490 23 217 – 1 178
strong LCC #edges 602 722 243 600 – 31 572
malicious if a high fraction of outgoing influence exerted by
the node is distrusted by out-neighbors. Formally, given a bud-
get k, the method selects the top-k users in a ranking solution
determined as r(v) = (W¯−/(W¯−+W¯+)) log(|Nout(v)|), for
every v such that N in(v) = ∅, where W¯+, W¯− are shortcut
symbols to denote the sum of trust (resp. distrust) weights,
respectively, outgoing from v.
Exogenous and influential trusted sources of infor-
mation: Analogously to the previous method, this one,
dubbed I-Sources, searches for the “best” influential trusted
sources. The ranking function is as r(v) = (W¯+/(W¯− +
W¯+)) log(|Nout(v)|). Note that this still takes into account
the negative weights, because even a highly trusted user might
be distrusted by some other users (e.g., “haters”).
Stress triads: This strategy is based on the notion of
structural balance in triads [14]. Suppose node v has two
incoming connections, the one from node z with negative
weight, and the other from u with positive weight; moreover,
there is a trust link from z to u. We say that z is a
stress-node since, despite the distrusted link to v, it could
indirectly influence v through the trusted connection with u.
Our proposed Stress-Triads strategy searches for all triads
containing stress-nodes and selects as seeds the first k stress-
nodes with the highest number of triads they participate to.
Newcomers: We call a node v ∈ V as a newcomer if
all of its incoming edges are timestamped as less recent than
its oldest outgoing edge. The start-time of v is the oldest
timestamped associated with its incoming edges. We divide the
set of newcomers into two groups obtained by equal-frequency
binning on the temporal range specific of a network. Upon
this, we distinguish between two strategies, dubbed Least-
New and Most-New, which correspond to the selection of k
newcomers having highest out-degree among those with the
oldest start-time and with the newest start-time, respectively.
Both strategies were applied to Wiki-Vote and Wiki-Conflict,
due to the availability of timestamped edges.
Settings of the model parameters: For every user v,
the exogenous activation-threshold θv and quiescence time
τv were chosen uniformly at random within [0,1] and [0,5].
Moreover, λ and δ were varied between 0 and 5, and between
0 and 0.5, respectively.
IV. RESULTS
A. Evaluation of nC-F 2DLT
Spread, stressed users: We analyzed the number of final
activated users (i.e., spread) by varying the size (k) of seed set,
for every seed selection strategy. We initially assumed constant
(a) Epinions, I-Sources (b) Wiki-Vote, Stress-Triads
Figure 5: Spread of nC-F 2DLT by varying seed set size (k)
and selection strategy.
activation thresholds (i.e., ϑ(·, ·) = 0) and constant quiescence
times (i.e., ψ(·, ·) = 0). Moreover, we distinguished between
“stressed” and “unstressed” users, being the former regarded
as active users having at least one distrusted active in-neighbor.
As shown in Fig. 5 for some representative cases, we found
the activation of the stressed users were activated less than the
unstressed users, although with similar trend as k increases.
I-Sources along with Stress-Triads revealed higher spread
capability, in all networks (with the exception of Wiki-Vote).
Least-New prevailed on Most-New for lower k. M-Sources
led to a much lower spread than the other strategies.
Activation loss: We further investigated the activation
loss, i.e., the percentage decrease of activated users due to the
enabling of the time-varying quiescence factor (i.e., λ > 0
in Eq. 2). By setting a relatively large λ (set to 5) and k
(set to 50), we found high percentage of activation loss for
the initial time steps, especially for Stress-Triads, which
might be explained since the initial influenced users tend
to be subjected to a certain amount of distrusted influence.
As the time horizon approaches, the activation loss tends to
significantly decrease, down to nearly zero in most cases, with
few exceptions including the use of I-Sources in Slashdot and
Epinions, and Stress-Triads and M-Sources in Wiki-Vote.
B. Evaluation of competitive models
To analyze the behavior of competitive models, we simu-
lated a scenario of limitation of misinformation spread, i.e.,
we assumed that the “bad” campaign has started diffusing,
and the “good” campaign is carried out in reaction to the first
one. To this end, preliminarily to this evaluation, we investi-
gated about proper combinations of seed selection strategies.
Table III provides statistics about selected pairs of strategies,
for two campaigns carried out independently to each other,
with k = 50. We observe that using Stress-Triads and I-
Sources for the bad and good campaigns, respectively, is
particularly significant, with sharing close to 100% in Epinions
and Slashdot and above 80% in Wiki-Conflict.
In the following, we present results aimed to understand the
effect of the confirmation bias factor on the users’ campaign-
changes/deactivations, under the case of “real-time correction”
or “delayed correction” by the good campaign against the
bad one (cf. Introduction). We used fixed-probability as tie-
breaking rule, with probability 1 for the bad campaign, and we
Table III: Statistics about selected pairs of strategies for two
campaigns: the seed set S(1)0 (resp. S
(2)
0 ) computed for the
first-started or “bad” (resp. second-started or “good”) cam-
paign SS1 (resp. SS2), the spread |Φ(S(1)0 )|(resp.|Φ(S(2)0 )|),
the fraction of spread of the bad campaign shared with the
good campaign (shared column), the percentage of shared
users that were activated first by the bad campaign (SS1 first
column), the average time of activation of the shared users,
and the average time of activation of the shared users by
the bad campaign before the good campaign, and vice versa.
Abbreviations IS, MS, ST, LN, and MN stand for I-Sources,
M-Sources, Stress-Triads, Least-New, and Most-New.
network SS1 SS2 |Φ(S(1)0 )| |Φ(S(2)0 )| shared SS1 avg. activation time
first any SS1 SS2
first first
Epinions ST IS 10595 23321 0.99 28% 6.03 0.67 5.27MS IS 59 23321 0.01 100% 4.0 3.0 0.0
Slashdot ST IS 3263 18671 0.98 40% 6.56 2.54 7.63MS IS 58 18671 0.05 100% 4.0 5.0 0.0
Wiki- ST IS 344 5968 0.84 95% 2.43 1.43 4.93MS IS 203 5968 0.75 98% 3.64 0 9.5
Conflict LN MN 216 424 0.7 100% 3.77 0 0
Wiki- ST IS 727 394 0.45 78% 4.32 0.54 5.87MS IS 172 394 0.41 79% 4.04 0.05 3.93
Vote LN MN 165 159 0.13 63% 2.72 0.0 4.37
(a) Epinions (b) Slashdot
(c) Wiki-Conflict (d) Wiki-Vote
Figure 6: spC-F 2DLT : Spread, number of switched users
(lower whiskers), and number of switches (lower whiskers),
in log-scale, by varying start-delay (∆ t0) of the “good”
campaign (second bars), for δ = {0, 0.1} and k = 50.
set the time horizon to the end-time of the (non-competitive)
diffusion of the bad campaign.
Evaluation of spC-F 2DLT : Figure 6 shows results on
the campaign spreads, the number of users activated for one
campaign that switched to the other campaign, and the total
number of switches, by varying δ and start-delays ∆ t0 of the
good campaign (up to 75% of the time horizon).
Focusing on the campaign-switches, for δ = 0, the number
of switched users follows a nearly constant trend in most
networks, as the start-delay increases, while the total number
of switches is subjected to a more evident decreasing trend.
Also, we observe a higher number of (unique and total)
switches from the bad campaign to the good one, than vice
versa. Setting δ = 0.1 leads to a general decrease in the switch
measurements w.r.t. the corresponding case for δ = 0.
Evaluation of npC-F 2DLT : The spread trends ob-
served under npC-F 2DLT are similar to those corresponding
to spC-F 2DLT but, more importantly, the occurrence of
deactivation events, which are admitted by npC-F 2DLT , ap-
peared to favor the good campaign strategy. In particular, with
combinations Stress-Triads or M-Sources vs. I-Sources, the
number of user-unique and total deactivations tend to increase
(resp. decrease) for the bad (resp. good) campaign as ∆ t0
increases; also, for δ > 0, the spread of the good campaign
would remain higher than the spread of the bad one, due to a
much larger number of deactivations from the bad campaign,
up to one order of magnitude in Epinions and Slashdot, or
even two orders of magnitude in Wiki networks.
C. Lessons Learned
The results of our evaluation revealed that the average
user’s sensitivity in the negative influence perceived from
distrusted neighbors (which is controlled by λ) makes the seed
identification process more aware of the negative influence
spread, thus considering the quiescence-biased contingencies
by which a non-negligible fraction of users cannot be activated
before the time limit.
The confirmation-bias effect underlying δ may lead the
“stronger” campaign (i.e., the one able to activate most users at
the early steps of its diffusion) to increase its spread capability.
When using the semi-progressive competitive model
(spC-F 2DLT ), the combined effect of increased δ with
an increase in the delay of the beginning of the second-
started (good) campaign may reduce its capability of “saving”
users from the influence of the bad campaign; therefore,
to limit misinformation spread, the good campaign should
concentrate its (activation) efforts in the early stage of its
diffusion. Nonetheless, the non-progressive competitive model
(npC-F 2DLT ) appears to be more robust to the increase of
δ, in favor of the good campaign. Yet, npC-F 2DLT tends to
favor deactivation events (for users previously activated by the
weaker campaign) over switched events. Overall, this would
suggest that the misinformation limitation problem could be
more easily addressed by allowing users to “reset” their
opinion when biased by the bad campaign, before eventually
adopting the good campaign’s choice.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a novel class of trust-aware, dynamic LT-
based models for non-competitive and competitive influence
propagation. Evaluation on real-world, publicly available net-
works included simulations of scenarios of misinformation
spread limitation, based on realistic strategies of selection of
the initial influential users. Our models pave the way for the
development of sophisticated methods to solve misinformation
spread limitation and related optimization problems.
Further information on this research work can be found at
http://people.dimes.unical.it/andreatagarelli/ ffdlt/ .
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